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Abstract
What role do feelings play in interpersonal perception? This chapter reviews our 
empirical research program on affective influences on social judgments, and a new 
theoretical framework accounting for such effects is presented. In the first section, models 
of social judgment, and the affect-priming framework are outlined. Empirical work on 
affective influences on social judgments is reviewed next. Results show robust and reliable 
mood effects on a variety of social judgments, from simple behaviour interpretation tasks 
to complex and demanding attribution and interpersonal preference judgments. The role of 
affect in social judgments by children, in discussion groups, and in field settings is also 
considered, and evidence for the affect-priming model from reaction-time studies is 
summarized. In the final section, more recent theoretical formulations are discussed, and a 
multi-process model able to account for the empirical findings is presented. The 
implications of these results for everyday social judgments, and for contemporary models of 
social cognition are considered.
Affect and judgments - 3
Introduction
It has been well recognized by writers, artists and philosophers throughout the ages 
that emotions often influence the quality of our social judgments. Descartes (1649) 
proposed such a link between ’feelings’ and ’thinking’ almost 350 years ago, as did James 
(1890) in his ’Principles of Psychology’. Yet psychological research on this intriguing 
problem is a relatively recent development. It is only in the last few decades that empirical 
studies investigated some of processes that mediate affective influences on social 
perception and judgments. This chapter reviews our empirical research program on the 
role of affective states in social judgments, and a new multi-process theoretical model 
accounting for such effects is outlined.
Interpersonal judgments
Feelings must clearly be a part of any plausible model of social perception. As Zajonc 
(1980) argued, affect is perhaps the primary medium of interpersonal behaviour, and 
affective reactions may often precede or inform subsequent cognitive elaborations (cf.
Clore & Parrott, 1991; Niedenthal & Showers, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Strong 
affective responses to others may be triggered by such fleeting cues as a facial expression, a 
tone of voice or a nonverbal gesture (cf. Forgas, 1988; Forgas, O’Connor & Morris, 1983; 
Niedenthal & Showers, 1991). What is it about social judgments that makes them sensitive 
to such affective influences?
The nature o f social judgments. Unlike physical perception, social judgments require 
the use of high-level cognitive processes necessary to infer characteristics that are not 
directly observable (Kelly, 1955). Affect can play an important role in person perception 
both through (a) influencing the kind of information processing strategy adopted by judges 
(Forgas, 1981b; 1983b), and (b) through its influence on the way social information about 
another person is attended to, selected, interpreted, learned, remembered and evaluated in 
judgments (Bower, 1991; Clore & Parrott, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1988; Schwarz, 1990). In
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essence, it is the constructive, inferential nature of social perception processes that 
underlies affective influences on judgments.
Constructivist vs. mechanistic approaches. The constructive, top-down nature of person 
perception has been clearly recognised since classical theorists such as Heider (1958), Kelly 
(1955) and Asch (1946) first argued that the expectations and ideas of the perceiver have a 
major impact on judgments. Judgments of even the simplest kind of person stimuli are 
subject to constructive perceptual biases as the perceiver seeks to impose shape, form or 
’Gestalt* on the stimulus (Asch, 1946). Kelly’s (1955) work on personal constructs, and later 
research on implicit personality theories yielded hard empirical evidence for the important 
role of constructive processes in person perception (Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972).
Remarkably, the role of affect in that process has not received much attention until quite 
recently.
The strong tradition of constructivism in person perception was counterbalanced by a 
second perhaps more atomistic and mechanistic approach. ’Cognitive algebra’, a field 
pioneered by Anderson (1974) and rooted in the psychophysical measurement tradition 
conceptualized social judgments as the predictable outcome of simple, arithmetically 
derived information integration processes. The characteristics and constructions of the 
perceiver were of little interest within this paradigm, although affect could in principle be 
seen as part of the information integration process (Kaplan, 1991). Anderson’s (1974) 
model assumes that (1) traits may be treated as in a sense ’given’, and (2) that traits retain 
permanent, enduring meanings. Both of these assumptions are open to challenge. In social 
perception the information is hardly ever ’given’ but has to be selected (Forgas, 1981b), and 
what is chosen has a major impact on judgments. Secondly, trait meanings are rarely 
constant; as Asch (1946) argued, traits seem to live an intensely social life, their meanings 
forever shifting and changing depending on what other information is available to the 
perceiver. It seems then that the information integration approach and its metaphor of the 
social perceiver as a passive information processor may at best be an incomplete account of 
interpersonal perception (cf. Argyle, 1991).
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The social cognition approach. The holistic, constructivist and the mechanistic, 
reductionist views of person perception were ultimately reconciled in the current 
information processing paradigm. ’Person memory’ is the study of the cognitive processes 
involved in the encoding, retrieval and combination of information about other people 
(Hastie, Ostrom, Ebbesen, Wyer, Hamilton & Carlston, 1980; Wyer & Srull, 1989). In 
these terms social perception is analogous to a process of semantic categorisation, 
involving the translation of information about people into semantic representations, and 
the activation of prior experiences and knowledge structures (Wyer & Srull, 1989).
It is the process of activation of representational structures that allows perceivers to 
’go beyond the information given’, by engaging in ’top-down’ processing, making inferences 
and attributions about their target based on their prior experiences with people. The model 
links person perception, clearly a high-level cognitive process, with established information 
processing and memoiy paradigms in cognitive psychology. However, as we have argued 
some years ago, the ’person memory’ paradigm continues to assume ’cold’ cognition on the 
part of the perceiver, where feelings, evaluations and preferences are relatively neglected 
(Forgas, 1981b; 1983b). The model’s focus on the isolated, lonely perceiver separated from 
the social and cultural context has been another point of criticism (Argyle, 1991).
It is also memory-based models, such as the associative network model developed by 
Bower (1981; 1991) and Isen (1984; 1987), that first explicitly dealt with the role of affect in 
cognition and judgments. It is this formulation that initially stimulated our work on mood 
effects on social judgments.
Affect-priming models
To the extent that social perception is constructive, the availability of memories, 
constructs and associations will have an influence on this process. Memory-based 
expectations and assumptions will influence the evidence we select, the interpretations that 
we make and ultimately, the judgments we arrive at. As most social behaviours are 
complex and ambiguous, alternative and often conflicting interpretations are always
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possible (Heider, 1958), and typically there are few real criteria for deciding the accuracy 
of judgments.
In his associative network model, Bower (1981; 1991) suggested that mood states may 
be linked to cognitions within a single associative network of representations. Affect may 
influence judgments through the automatic priming of its associated cognitive constructs, as 
"activation of an emotion node also spreads activation throughout the memory structures to 
which it is connected" (Bower, 1981, p. 135). This is essentially a memory model, accounting 
for the role of affect in information storage and retrieval. However, the model also has 
wide-spread consequences for social judgments, as it implies that the experience of a mood 
state will -
(a) facilitate the learning of mood-congruent information because of the availability 
of a richer mood-congruent associative base (jmood-congruent learning);
(b) selectively focus attention on mood-congruent information (imood-congruent 
attention);
(c) facilitate the recall of information encountered in a matching mood state (imood- 
state dependent memory), and
(e) through the superior availability of mood-consistent constructs and associations, 
facilitate the interpretation of ambiguous information in a mood-consistent manner (mood- 
congruent associations).
The cumulative effect is a mood-consistent bias in social judgments. According to the 
model, feelings influence not only what we see, learn and pay attention to, but also what we 
remember, the associations we form and the way we interpret the available information. In 
brief, affect has a similar role to enduring expectations and ’implicit theories of personality’ 
in guiding the constructive aspect of social judgments (Asch, 1946; Kelly, 1955; Rosenberg 
& Sedlak, 1972).
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The model has received varied empirical support (Blaney, 1986), although the 
judgmental effects are now well established (Bower, 1991; Forgas, 1990; Forgas & Bower, 
1988; Mayer et al., 1990). It was this model that provided the initial impetus for much of 
our work on social judgments.
Affect, mood and emotion. The feeling states we studied are similar to the mild, 
nonspecific experiences of feeling ’good’ or feeling ’bad’, a common experience in everyday 
life. The precise definition of the terms ’affect’, ’mood’ and ’emotion’ remains unresolved in 
the literature. For our purposes, we shall use the term ’affect’ to include both moods and 
emotion. In turn, moods, unlike emotions, are less intense, are more enduring, and usually 
do not have a salient immediate antecedent cause, or much cognitive content.
Prior evidence for mood effects on judgments. Although concentrated research on this 
topic is a fairly recent development, there have been several demonstrations of mood 
effects on social judgments in the literature. As early as 1940, Razran found that good or 
bad mood (induced by a free lunch, or unpleasant smells) influenced judgments of 
persuasive messages. Later, the tendency by fearful subjects to perceive another person as 
fearful was interpreted in psychoanalytic terms by Feshbach & Singer (1957), as 
"suppression of fear facilitates the tendency to project fear onto another social object" (p. 
286). Other studies manipulated affect through the behaviour of a confederate (Izard,
1964; Wehmer & Izard, 1962), and found positive mood effects on judgments and 
performance.
More recent evidence indicating more negative judgments when taken in aversive 
environments (Griffitth, 1970), after seeing depressing films (Gouaux, 1970) or after 
negative interpersonal feedback (Gouaux & Summers, 1973) was interpreted in terms of 
conditioning processes (Clore & Byrne, 1972). Neither the psychoanalytic, nor the 
conditioning models deal with the cognitive consequences of affect, although Feshbach & 
Singer’s (1957) proposition the cognition in a sense becomes ’infused’ by affect comes 
closest to contemporary theorizing. Accounting for how such ’infusion’ comes about is
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precisely what affect-priming theories are about, and what our experiments, described 
below, were designed to explore.
Affect in social judgments: empirical investigations
In recent years, our studies investigated the role of low-intensity, transient moods in a 
variety of social judgments (eg. Forgas, 1989; 1990; 1991a,b,c; Forgas & Bower, 1987, 1988; 
Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984; Forgas, Bower & Moylan, 1990; Forgas, Burnham & 
Trimboli, 1988; Forgas & Moylan, 1987). In describing this research, we shall proceed from 
looking at simple, basic judgments to more complex, elaborate decisions about attributions 
and interpersonal choices. Work on mood effects on social judgments in children, and on 
group judgments will also be summarized.
The basic effect: mood and behaviour interpretation.
In an early experiment we (Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984) examined how moods 
influence the way people perceive and interpret their own, and others’, social behaviours.
The basic interpretation of simple social acts is the foundation of person perception 
(Heider, 1958). Such judgments are often data-driven, and to make the test of mood effects 
on judgments even more challenging, we used videotaped behaviours to provide subjects 
with objective behavioural evidence.
Pairs of subjects were videotaped in four different interaction episodes of varying 
formality and intimacy (Forgas, 1982), in what they believed were trial interviews with 
female interviewers. One day later, in a ’separate’ experiment, subjects were hypnotically 
induced to feel happy or sad. They then looked at the video-tape of their interactions the 
day before, and were asked to rate positive, skilled, and negative, unskilled behaviours both 
for themselves and for their partner.
We found a strong mood bias in these judgments that was universal across the four 
interaction episodes, suggesting the cross-situational generality of this result. Happy 
subjects saw more positive, skilled and fewer negative, unskilled behaviours than did sad 
subjects (Figure 1). Sad subjects, however, were particularly critical of themselves, a 
pattern similar to the self-deprecating bias often found in depression (Roth & Rehm,
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1980). Happy subjects also recalled more details about easy, informal episodes, while 
people in a sad mood remembered more about difficult, formal interaction episodes, a 
pattern suggesting a mood-state dependent memory effect.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
These results generally support an affect-priming model, suggesting that even basic 
interpretations about ongoing social behaviours are influenced by the selective priming of 
mood-congruent constructs. The self-other differences in negative mood may be due to the 
superior priming self-deprecatory yet other-enhancing cognitions, a thought pattern 
probably common in dysphoria (Ottaviani & Beck, 1988). Further, social norms are also 
more likely to inhibit negative judgments of others rather than the self, contributing to the 
asymmetric positive-negative mood effects found here and elsewhere.
This experiment presented a particularly challenging test of mood biases in social 
perception. Most everyday social judgments are based on far more elusive evidence than 
videotaped encounters, and are thus even more likely to be influenced by moods. The self- 
other differences found here are consistent with other evidence, as well as clinical research 
(Forgas & Bower, 1988; Ottaviani & Beck, 1988), and offer an experimental demonstration 
of depressogenic cognition (Roth & Rehm, 1980).
Processing effects: reaction time data
In follow-up experiments we sought to precisely measure the processing times and 
latencies of judgments as a function of the subjects’ mood state. In one such study (Forgas 
& Bower, 1987), happy, sad or neutral subjects read positive or negative details about other 
people on a computer screen as part of an impression formation task. In fact, the computer 
was programmed to accurately record how long each subject took to read each piece of 
positive or negative information about a person, and how long they took to make each 
positive and negative impression formation judgment.
Consistent with affect-priming models, we found that people took longer reading, and 
learning information that matched their mood state (Figure 2), presumably because of the
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longer, and more thorough encoding of mood-consistent information into an extensive and 
already activated associative base (Bower, 1991).
The selective attention to, and learning of mood-congruent details resulted in happy 
people making more positive judgments, and sad people being more critical in their 
perceptions of the same target. We also analysed how long it took subjects to make positive 
or a negative judgments. Results showed that mood-consistent judgments took less time to 
make than inconsistent judgments, due to the superior priming of mood-consistent 
constructs (Figure 2).
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
These results are broadly consistent with priming models suggesting that by 
"spreading activation, a dominant emotion will enhance the availability of emotion- 
congruent interpretations and salience of congruent stimulus materials for learning."
(Bower, 1981, p.451). A richer associative base may lead to the slower and more detailed 
processing of mood-consistent information in a learning task (Craik & Tulving, 1975), but 
the faster recall of mood-consistent details in a judgmental task.
Developmental aspects: Affect and judgments in children
Most research on mood and judgments focuses on adults. Little is known about mood 
effects on how young children learn, remember and use information in their social 
judgments about others. In one study, we (Forgas, Burnham & Trimboli, 1988) asked 
school children to form impressions about two other children, while they were experiencing 
happy or sad moods after watching cheerful or depressing videotapes. A day later, a 
matching or non-matching mood state was induced, and the children’s memory and person 
perception judgments were assessed. We found evidence for mood-state dependent 
memory, as characters seen in matching encoding and retrieval moods were remembered 
better. Mood also provided a helpful differentiating context for remembering details about 
different targets (Bower, 1981). Interestingly, there was also a significant negativity bias in 
children’s memory and judgments about others, rather than the positivity bias often found 
with adults. To the extent that children have a more restricted repertoire of emotional
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experiences, and may not have fully internalized adult norms controling negativity, these 
differences were not entirely surprising.
In general, we have found overall support in our studies for the kind of mood-induced 
perceptual biases predicted by the associative network model. However, negative mood 
effects were less consistent and robust than positive mood effects in this and other studies 
(Forgas et al., 1984; Forgas & Bower, 1987, 1988). One explanation for this is normative: 
rules and norms constraining negative affect and its expression may be superimposed on 
the land of symmetrical, automatic priming effects predicted by the network model.
Greater negativity bias by children than adults is consistent with this account (Forgas et al., 
1988). Negative moods may also trigger more systematic and effortful information 
processing (Clark & Isen, 1982), while positive moods lead to more simplified, heuristic 
processing strategies (Schwarz, 1990). Some of these issues were explored in our more 
recent experiments, looking at mood effects on complex social decisions and attributions 
(Forgas, 1990, 1991a,b; Forgas, Bower & Moylan, 1990).
Affect and attribution judgments
In a series of recent experiments, we looked at affective influences on attributions for 
achievement (Forgas et al., 1990). This topic is of particular interest because causal 
attributions are not in themselves valenced, and demonstrating mood effects on such 
judgments would help to extend the generality of the paradigm. Mood effects on 
achievement attributions are also of substantive interest. Despite the roots of attribution 
research in phenomenological theorizing (Heider, 1958), perceiver characteristics such as 
mood received surprisingly little interest in the attribution literature. This is all the more 
surprising as achievement attributions are closely related to motivation, and have been 
shown to have significant motivational and affective consequences (Weiner, 1980). By 
comparing attributions for self and others for success and failure outcomes, we may also 
contrast motivational and cognitive theories. The self-serving motivational account implies 
more self-enhancing and other-deprecating judgments in dysphoria. Cognitive accounts in
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contrast imply the opposite; as primed negative cognitions should selectively bias 
judgments of the self, but less so of others (Forgas & Bower, 1988; Roth & Rehm, 1980).
In the first experiment in this series, subjects feeling happy or sad after watching a 
videotape made attributions for success or failure in typical 'life dilemmas’ (e.g. succeeding 
or failing in a job, winning or losing on an investment, etc.). We found that happy subjects 
made more lenient attributions, identifying internal, stable causes for success, and external, 
unstable causes for failure, while sad subjects did the opposite.
Having established the basic effect, the next experiments extended these findings by 
(a) looking at real-life rather than hypothetical outcomes, (b) comparing attributions to the 
self vs. attributions to others, (c) specifically assessing the role of cognitive as against 
motivational processes in the attribution outcome, and (c) exploring the role of mood 
states in self-efficacy judgments (Bandura, 1977). In attributions for a real-life event, doing 
well or badly at an exam (Arkin & Maruyama, 1978), subjects in the control group 
demonstrated the now familiar self-serving bias, giving more internal and stable 
attributions for their own successes than failures compared to their attributions to others 
(Figure 3). Positive mood led to a relative decline in the ego-defensive bias, with 
comparatively more favourable attributions to both self and other. Surprisingly, when 
depressed and presumably most in need to ego-defensive attributions, sad mood subjects 
were particularly critical of themselves, blaming stable and internal causes for failure, and 
crediting unstable, external causes for success. Yet others continued to be given credit for 
success, and no blame for failing (see Figure 3). This absence of self-serving bias in 
negative mood is inconsistent with motivational accounts, but appears consistent with 
cognitive explanations.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
In further experiments, we looked at mood effects on quantitative estimates of 
performance by self and others, as well as self-efficacy judgments. Results were consistent 
with the earlier studies. For example, we found further evidence for self-deprecatory but 
other-enhancing judgments in dysphoria, as subjects tended to overestimate the level of 
achievement by others, and underestimate their own level of efficacy in future tasks when
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compared to control and positive mood subjects. These results help to link mood effects on 
attribution judgments to future achievement, as several studies now show that self-efficacy 
judgments are a significant predictor of subsequent achievement and performance 
(Bandura, 1977).
The self-other differences found here suggest the selective recall of other-enhancing 
and self-deprecatory cognitions in dysphoria. These differences appear consistent with 
affect-priming models, but may at first seem difficult to reconcile with affect-as-information 
theories (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991), as it is unclear how the same negative 
affective state could simultaneously inform negative judgments of the self, but positive 
judgments about others. However, more recent versions of the affect-as-information 
models allow for this possibility by specifying that affect may selectively inform judgments 
about the source to which it is attributed (in this case, the self) without similarly influencing 
judgments about others (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). The kind of self-other differences found 
here also mirror the clinical evidence (Ottaviani & Beck, 1988; Roth & Rehm, 1980) as 
depressed patients often exhibit identical self-specific negative biases in judgments.
Affect and interpersonal preferences
Interpersonal choices are among the most complex kinds of decisions people make 
about each other. Selecting an interaction partner is an important and recurring feature of 
both our private and our working lives. Even enduring relationships may be seen in terms 
of a consecutive series of positive partner choices (Levinger, 1990). Evidence for the role of 
affect in interpersonal preferences comes from the early work of Schachter (1959) and 
Samoff & Zimbardo (1961). Recent evidence also shows that interaction with others in a 
matching mood is more rewarding (Locke & Horowitz, 1990). Surprisingly, the information 
processing strategies underlying such motivated interpersonal choices received little 
attention to date. Yet there is growing recognition of the motivated character of many 
basic cognitive processes in the recent social cognition literature (Kunda, 1990; Parrott & 
Sabini, 1990; Sanitioso, Kunda & Fong, 1990; et al.). The analysis of mood effects on 
motivated interpersonal choices was the aim of these experiments (Forgas, 1991a).
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We expected that the combination of negative mood and making an interpersonal 
choice with personal consequences will lead people to employ targeted, motivated 
processing strategies. Motivated processing implies a directed search for a rewarding 
partner, involving a selective bias towards information relevant to that objective in the 
course of the decision process. These expectations can no longer be derived from affect- 
priming theories, which imply relatively unbiased, symmetrical and un-motivated cognitive 
processing. In terms of Zajonc's (1980) arguments, these experiments demonstrate decision 
processes when preferences do indeed precede inferences.
The procedure in this series of investigations required subjects make an interpersonal 
choice, selecting a partner either for themselves (high personal relevance) or somebody 
else (low personal relevance) for a cooperative task, while they were experiencing a 
positive, neutral or negative mood state induced in an ostensibly separate experiment. We 
carefully analyzed not only the outcome of people's interpersonal choices, but also the kind 
of information they selected, and the speed, efficiency, and the information-search 
strategies they employed (Forgas, 1989; 1991a).
In the first experiment, four potential partners were described in terms of twelve 
features, including both desirable and undesirable, and social and task-related 
characteristics. We found a significant tendency by sad subjects to prefer partners with 
desirable social characteristics for themselves, but to choose partners with good task skills 
for others. Sad subjects also remembered more social than task information later on, but 
only when the choice was personally relevant to them. These judgmental and memory 
biases go beyond affect-priming models, and show the influence of secondary, motivated 
preferences on information processing (Kunda, 1990).
Our next experiment used an improved methodology to more accurately chart the 
exact steps involved in making an interpersonal decision. This time, potential partners were 
described in ’personal files’ on a series of cards. Subjects were asked to sequentially 
number every card (information unit) as they looked at it, and also rate the relevance of 
the information it contained. This way, a step-by-step record of the decision processes and 
the perceived contribution of each information unit was obtained.
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FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
We again found strong evidence for motivated processing by dysphoric subjects. They 
preferred socially rewarding rather than competent partners for themselves, but not for 
others, and were relatively faster in reaching such a decision (Figure 4). Dysphoric subjects 
also preferred social to task information, and used an impression formation rather than a 
comparison-by-features strategy in their choices. In contrast, positive mood subjects used 
an efficient and reasonably appropriate strategy by focussing on task-related features.
These results complement previous work on mood effects on complex decisions (Janis & 
Mann, 1977). Although in a some studies mood had no effect on hypothetical choices (Isen 
& Means, 1983), our results suggests that motivated processing may be a feature of 
involving, personally relevant choices only (Kunda, 1990).
In the next experiment in this series, we introduced a computer-controlled procedure 
to present the information about potential partners, and to measure the time it took for 
subjects to select, and examine each item of task or social information. With this more 
sensitive procedure, results once again confirmed the use of directed, motivated decision 
processes. In particular, we found that sad subjects making a personal choice required less 
time to select a social as against a task-related item of information, but took significantly 
longer reading and examining such details. Consistent with experiment 1, their memory for 
such information was also superior.
These three experiments then offer convergent evidence for the role of moods in 
triggering motivated choice strategies. These effects are quite different from the kind of 
unbiased, automatic processes predicted by affect-priming theories (Bower, 1991; Forgas & 
Bower, 1988). Evidence for the motivated character of social information processing is now 
beginning to emerge from other areas of social cognition research (Kunda, 1990; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Schwarz, 1990; Strack etal., 1988; Tesser, 1986). Indeed, it seems that 
dysphoria may often generate intentional, motivated strategies specifically designed to 
eliminate the unpleasant affective state (Clark & Isen, 1982). Motivated processing is a 
common and as yet little researched strategy in person perception that probably plays an 
important role in many interpersonal judgments both by normal and by depressed
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populations (Ottaviani & Beck, 1988). Any comprehensive theoretical account of mood 
effects on social judgments would have to include motivational processing as one of the 
available processing strategies to subjects.
Affect in group versus individual judgments
The studies described so far - as indeed almost all research on social cognition - focus 
on the behaviour of isolated individuals (Forgas, 1981b; 1983b). Yet realistic analyses of 
social behaviour cannot remain exclusively at the level of the individual (Argyle, 1991). In 
contemporary society, many important judgments and decisions are made by groups, in the 
belief that such choices will be less biased and more representative of collective 
preferences. In particular, groups are supposed to eliminate affective biases that may 
distort individual judgments. We examined this assumption in one of our experiments, 
comparing mood effects on individual and group judgments (Forgas, 1990).
Existing research suggests that group discussion per se may be the source of 
significant bias in the decision-making process (Forgas, 1977; 1981a; Moscovici & 
Zavalloni, 1969). In our study, individual and group judgments of nine person categories 
(e.g. farmers, Catholics, doctors, Italians) were performed by the same people on two 
different occasions, separated by a two-week interval. A happy, neutral or sad affective 
state was induced in subjects using videotaped presentations before each of the individual 
and the group judgments, in a complete factorial design.
We again found a significant mood-congruent bias on individual judgments. 
Perceptions on three judgmental dimensions - evaluation, competence and self-confidence 
- were more positive in a happy mood, and more negative in a sad mood than judgments by 
controls, as implied by affect-priming models. However, we also found an interaction 
between mood and the influence of group discussion on judgments. In a positive mood the 
extremity of group judgments increased further than for individuals, consistent with the 
predictions of group extremity shift theories. In essence, this is due to the combination of 
two processes, mood-congruent judgmental bias, accentuated by group-induced extremity 
shift. In contrast, in a negative mood there was no difference in the extremity of individual
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vs. group judgments. In fact, there was a slight trend for negative individual judgments to 
become somewhat less extreme after a group discussion.
How can we account for these effects? It is likely that mood had an influence on the 
kind of processing strategies adopted by groups under these circumstances. The 
combination of group discussion and negative mood should have triggered a more careful 
and controlled processing strategy (Schwarz, 1990), a style involving careful, systematic 
processing, which should have led to the consequent reduction in the negativity of 
judgments. Such a processing and interaction style would also tend to highlight the norms 
constraining negative judgments of others. Both of these processes should act to selectively 
inhibit the extremity of negative judgmental biases, but not positively biased judgments. 
We are now doing further work looking at the actual interactive strategies used by people 
when making group judgments in different moods to obtain more direct evidence for these 
effects.
Context effects on processing style
It appears from these studies that the kind of processing style adopted by people 
when making a judgment has a crucial role on mediating mood effects. In several recent 
studies we looked at the role of various judgmental contexts in triggering different 
processing strategies, and thus differential mood effects. For example, would mood effects 
be greater when judging a couple that is well-matched or ill-matched in terms of physical 
attractiveness? We expected that judgmental contexts that are unexpected and unusual 
should trigger more constructive, elaborative processing styles, and these in turn would be 
more likely to be influenced by mood effects.
In one recent experiment we asked people to form impressions of heterosexual 
couples who were either well-matched or badly matched in terms of physical attractiveness. 
Mood had a significantly greater effect on judgments when the same person was part of an 
ill-matched couple than a well-matched couple (Figure 5). We know from research on 
personal relationships that similarity and balance is a major feature of relationships, a
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point recognized both in theories of relationships (Heider, 1958; Levinger, 1990) and in 
empirical work on relationship perception (Forgas & Dobosz, 1980). Unbalanced physical 
attractiveness in a couple is atypical, and should have the effect of triggering more careful, 
constructive and analytic processing strategies. It is such constructive processing strategies 
that are more likely to be subject to mood-priming biases according to evidence from 
numerous studies (Fiedler, 1991; Forgas, 1991b), and our results appear to fit this pattern.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Mood effects on stereotyping.
Of all social judgments, it is stereotype judgments that are most likely to involve an 
affective dimension, a link that is implied both by cognitive and motivational accounts of 
stereotyping (Hamilton & Rose, 1980; Tajfel & Forgas, 1981). Yet few studies looked at 
mood-based biases in stereotype judgments. Generally, it seems that factors that increase 
the difficulty of the judgmental task, such as complexity or time pressure also make 
stereotyping more likely (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). 
Mackie et al. (1989) found that incongruence between information valence and a person's 
mood also increased the illusory correlation bias.
Following from the previous experiment, in one of our recent studies we attempted to 
show that mood effects on stereotype perception would be greater when judgments are 
made in an unusual context. We expected and found that a judges’ mood had a significantly 
greater impact on perceptions of Asian or Caucasian targets when these people were 
encountered in an unusual context, as part of a mixed-race dyad, than judgments of the 
same person when seen in a matched-race dyad (Forgas, 1991b) (Figure 6). These 
differences are again likely to be due to the different processing styles triggered by ’typical’ 
and ’atypical’ judgmental contexts. Seeing a person as part of a mixed-race dyad is more 
unusual and unexpected, and should trigger more detailed and systematic processing 
strategies, giving mood-primed associations a greater scope to influence such judgments.
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Affect and social judgments: evidence from field research
The laboratory studies summarized above provide convergent evidence for mood 
effects on a variety of judgments. Such affective biases do of course have important 
practical implications for clinical psychology (Ottaviani & Beck, 1988) as well as other 
fields. It seems that many everyday judgments such as personnel selection (Baron, 1987), 
judgments about health and illness (Salovey et al., 1991), or subjective well-being (Diener, 
1990; Strack, Schwarz, Argyle, 1991) and answers to surveys (Schwarz & Strack, 1990) are 
biased by affective state. It is of some importance then to demonstrate affective distortions 
in realistic field settings in order to establish the external validity of the phenomenon.
In several studies we found that judgmental distortions similar to those found in the 
laboratory can also reliably be obtained in natural settings. We used a variety of real-life 
events as mood manipulations. Supporters of winning or losing rugby teams, people who 
won or lost money in a betting shop, or received a small gift or a sweet in a shopping centre 
were our subjects, answering a variety of questions dealing with social judgments.
One study may suffice to illustrate our findings. In this investigation, almost one 
thousand visitors to happy, sad or aggressive films were interviewed immediately after 
leaving a movie theatre (Forgas & Moylan, 1987). They answered questions about a variety 
of issues, such as perceptions of political leaders, parties, as well as their life satisfaction 
and expectations about the future. Overall, subjects in a good mood after a happy film gave 
significantly more positive and lenient answers than did subjects who saw a sad or 
aggressive film (Figure 7). It seems that mood effects on social judgments are a common - 
and probably underestimated - feature of everyday life (cf. Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & 
Bless, 1991; Strack et al., 1991). Indeed, it seems that even naturally occurring fluctuations 
of everyday mood are quite sufficient to induce strong and significant judgmental 
distortions (Mayer et al., 1990).
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
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Despite strong cumulative empirical evidence for affective influences on social 
judgments, theoretical explanations of this phenomenon have not always kept pace with the 
research. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the development of an 
integrative theoretical framework capable of accounting for the empirical results so far 
available.
Theoretical considerations
As the above review shows, mood-priming models can account for many, but not all 
of our findings. Several new theoretical models have also been proposed in recent yean.
We shall briefly survey these conceptual alternatives before proposing an integrative 
theoretical model of mood effects on social judgments.
Alternative theoretical models
Affect-as-information theory. Unlike affect-priming models that deal with indirect and 
automatic mood effects on cognition, affect-as-information models posit a direct, 
informational role for affect (Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Accordingly, 
people form judgments based on a ’how do 1 feel about it?’ heuristic (Schwarz & Clore,
1988), consulting their mood in order to infer their evaluative reactions to a target. The 
theory predicts that only previously unattributed feelings can influence judgments, 
consistent with its roots in the misattribution of emotion and arousal paradigm (Schachter 
& Singer, 1962).
The affect-as-information model has become an influential alternative to mood- 
priming formulations recently, and can also be extended to account for some mood- 
congruent memory effects (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). If affect guides judgments, mood- 
congruent judgments in turn will prime mood-congruent recollections. Schwarz (1990; 
Schwarz & Bless, 1991) further suggests that affect may serve as information about 
problematic or unproblematic environments (Frijda, 1986), triggering heuristic, effort- 
minimizing or systematic, effortful cognitive processing strategies.
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Both the affect-priming and the affect-as-information models are essentially 
informational models, accounting for mood effects in terms of the direct or indirect 
informational consequences of moods. The two models are in a sense complementary 
xather than competing accounts (Bower, 1991; Clore & Parrott, 1991), often leading to 
similar predictions. The affect-as-information model deals with the direct informational 
functions of feelings, while affect-priming model refers to indirect effects. The affect-as- 
information model implies an all-or-nothing process, where judgments are fully affect- 
dependent or independent. Mood-priming in contrast implies a continuum of affective 
biases in judgments. In addition to these information-based models, a variety of process- 
based formulations have also been proposed recently to deal with mood effects on social 
judgments.
Mood and processing style. These models deal with mood effects in terms of 
contrasting alternative processing strategies. Clark & Isen (1982) distinguished between 
automatic processing such as the unconscious priming of mood-congruent information, and 
controlled processing , when conscious, effortful strategies are superimposed on an 
otherwise automatic process. Controlled processing may serve mood-maintenance in good 
moods, and mood-repair in bad moods. Our findings of mood-induced motivated 
processing in interpersonal preferences are consistent with such a controlled strategy. 
Others, such as Isen (1984; 1987) found that compared to control subjects, people in a 
positive mood often use more heuristic, truncated processing, use larger and more inclusive 
categories, are more creative, and are more likely to take risks as long this does not 
threaten their positive mood state. Such an effort-minimizing, simplifying processing style 
may be adopted because of the reduced cognitive capacity available to people when 
experiencing positive mood states, due to the activation of mood-related cognitions.
Mackie & Worth (1991) found support for such a cognitive rather than motivational 
account of these processing differences.
Another dual-process model by Petty & Cacioppo (1987) seeks to account for 
reactions to persuasive messages. According to the elaboration likelihood model careful,
Affect and judgments - 22
analytic or central-route processing or effort-minimizing, heuristic peripheral route 
processing may be triggered by a various personal and contextual factors. Affect may play 
an indirect role in central route processing, priming relevant information. In peripheral 
route processing affect may directly inform judgments (Schwarz, 1990). Petty, Gleicher & 
Baker (1991) found evidence for such an effect. Conversely, positive mood should induce 
peripheral route processing, and negative mood central route processing.
If affect is indeed a signal for benevolent or aversive situations (Clore & Parrott,
1991; Frijda, 1986), moods may inform us to engage in careful, effortful processing in 
dysphoria, and simplified, heuristic processing euphoria (Schwarz, 1990). This extension of 
the affect-as-information model seems to imply that processing decisions are in a sense 
post-judgmental, a point that may need further conceptual clarification.
Others, such as Fiedler (1991) distinguish between productive processes, involving the 
transformation, revision or elaboration of information, and reproductive processes based 
on mere information rehearsal. It is in productive processing that mood is more likely to 
play a role, while reproductive processes should be more impervious to mood states 
(Forgas, 1991a). Whether productive or reproductive processing occurs depends on the 
nature and complexity of the task, the kind of dependent variables used, and the state, 
motivation and characteristics of the judges, among others. Our studies showing greater 
mood effects in unusual contexts (when judging ill-matched couple, for example) are 
consistent with this approach.
What are the implications of these mood-process models for our understanding of 
mood effects on social judgments? These theories generally contrast two different 
processing styles, one simplified, effort-minimizing, expectation-driven, category-based and 
top-down, and the other analytic, accuracy-driven, attribute-based and bottom-up (Fiedler, 
1991; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Stangor, 1990; Wyer & Srull, 1989; et al.). The underlying 
common theme is that in some circumstances, people have little interest in the effortful 
analytic processing of a stimulus and rely instead on simplified, effort-minimizing strategies
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based on their expectations and cognitive categories. At other times, more careful, 
systematic processing will be adopted.
Mood may be an antecedent as well as a consequence of these processing choices. 
Generally, we would expect positive moods to facilitate simplified, reproductive processing, 
and negative mood to cue systematic, effortful processing (Schwarz, 1990). This may occur 
for either motivational, or cognitive reasons. In motivational terms, mood-maintenance 
when feeling good, and mood-repair in dysphoria may account for these processing 
preferences (Clark & Isen, 1982). In cognitive terms, positive mood signals benevolent 
environments and little need for cognitive effort; negative moods in turn signal problematic 
situations and the need for more effort and vigilance (Schwarz, 1990). Drawing on these 
informational as well as mood-processing formulations, an integrative multi-process model 
of mood effects on judgments will be outlined next.
A multi-process model.
Based on the available evidence, no single information processing model is likely to 
account for all the observed strategies available to people when making a social judgment. 
This is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is curious that the kind of single-process models 
commonly adopted from cognitive psychology were ever seriously expected to account for 
the rich variety of social phenomena to which they are now applied. Information processing 
models are typically developed to deal with data obtained in highly controlled experiments. 
Social psychology in turn deals with complex, context-dependent processes, as is the case in 
social judgments. In everyday life people must have multiple information processing 
strategies available to them when making social judgments. What are these alternative 
strategies, and how does affect influence the selection of a particular strategy? We shall 
consider these questions next.
Multi-process strategies. It is proposed here that there exist four quite different 
processing strategies in person perception. How affect influences a judgment will depend 
on which processing strategy is adopted.
Affect and judgments - 24
(1) A direct-access strategy is most likely when (a) the target is familiar, and (b) pre­
existing crystallized judgments are available. In this case, judgment involves the direct 
retrieval of the prior evaluation, without any on-line computation. Probably many, if not 
most of our everyday judgments are made in this way. Direct access limits the potential for 
mood biases as cued retrieval processes are relatively robust, and stored perceptions are 
powerful and even resistant to disaffirming evidence (Snyder, 1984).
(2) A motivated processing strategy may be employed when a perceiver (a) has no 
prior crystallized judgment to fall back on, and (b) there are strong motivational forces for 
a particular judgmental outcome to be achieved. This is the case when preferences indeed 
do come to guide inferences (Zajonc, 1980). For example, in a dysphoric mood judgments 
may be oriented towards controlling the negative mood state (Clark & Isen, 1982; Forgas, 
1991a). Affect is one, but not the only source of motivated processing. Personal relevance 
may also be a feature of motivated processing (cf. Forgas, 1989; 1990).
(3) The heuristic processing strategy is likely to be adopted when (a) no prior 
judgment is available, (b) no strong motivational forces mandating a particular outcome 
are present, (c) the judgment is made without the detailed consideration of the available 
information, because of (d) limits on cognitive processing capacity, or (e) lack of 
motivation. Judges may try to arrive at a judgment by the simplest and least effortful 
means, using irrelevant associations with extraneous variables (Griffitt, 1970), superficial 
similarity to a familiar category, or inferences from cues such prevailing affective state (cf. 
Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
(4) A substantive processing strategy is likely when (a) no pre-formed judgment is 
available, (b) judges need to select, interpret and integrate novel information about a 
person in computing a judgment, and (c) they are motivated and have sufficient cognitive 
capacity to do so. This kind of processing is implied by traditional models of person 
perception (Anderson, 1974; Asch, 1946; Kelly, 1955; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). The 
image of the ’dutiful information processor’, dealing with the information as available, is
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also at the heart of most cognitive models that assume automatic, uncontrolled, and fairly 
universal processing strategies. Many social-cognitive theories based on memory models 
also assume substantive processing in the assimilation of novel information into a pre­
existing category system (Bower, 1991; Hastie et al., 1980; Wyer & Srull, 1989). It is in the 
course of substantive processing that affect can play a major role through priming 
constructs and associations to be used in judgments (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984).
Choice o f processing strategy. Such a multi-process model as outlined here implies that 
the final choice of a particular strategy is based on multiple criteria. The model also 
highlights the fact that substantive processing, far from being the standard procedure, may 
in fact be only a 'default' option, used only when none of the other strategies are 
appropriate. What influences the choice of a particular processing strategy? A brief 
summary of the various factors that play a role in processing choices is given below.
The degree of familiarity of the target is probably the first critical feature perceivers 
consider in deciding how to process a judgment. Well-known targets may be judged on the 
basis of the direct retrieval of pre-formed, crystallized evaluations. Heuristic or category- 
based processing may be adopted in forming a judgment about people who are familiar but 
without an available crystallized judgment. Unusual or unexpected judgmental contexts 
should reduce familiarity and lead to the substantive processing even of familiar targets 
such as racial stereotypes, as found in our experiments described above.
The level of importance of the judgment should determine whether a retrieved direct- 
access judgment of a familiar target, or a judgment formed on the basis of heuristic 
processing is adopted, or further processing is undertaken.
Motivational influences on processing choices may be of two kinds. A general 
motivation to be accurate may be the consequence of the importance of the judgment, or 
other cues such as the informational influence of a negative mood mandating a more 
cautious and effortful approach (Kunda, 1990; Schwarz, 1990). Alternatively, specific 
motivation in the service of particular goals, such as desire for mood improvement (Forgas,
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1989), or the achievement of other objectives (Kunda, 1990) may also lead to motivated 
processing.
Cognitive capacity constraints may also have the effect of triggering heuristic 
processing strategies. Mood again may be one of the factors contributing to such capacity 
restrictions (Isen, 1984; Mackie & Worth, 1991).
Finally, the judges’ transient mood state itself may directly trigger effort-miminizing or 
effortful processing strategies. It is important to note that mood also has an indirect effect 
on various other factors that influence processing decisions, such as motivational objectives 
or capacity limit variables.
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
Implications o f the model. According to such a multi-process model, the influence of 
affect on judgments largely depends on which of the various strategies is adopted. A direct- 
access strategy, relying on the direct retrieval of pre-formed judgments may be quite 
impervious to affective biases. The substantive processing strategy in turn is most likely to 
be subject to indirect affect-priming distortions, resulting in the biased selection, learning, 
interpretation and retrieval of information about people as predicted by affect-priming 
theories (Forgas et al., 1984; Forgas & Bower, 1987; 1988). Many of our studies described 
above provide evidence for such affect-based distortions in the substantive processing of 
person perception judgments (cf. Forgas & Bower, 1987; 1988). We know least about the 
second, motivated processing strategy (Kunda, 1990). However, there is now growing 
evidence that motivation plays a role not only in interpersonal preferences (Schachter,
1959), but also in many of the perceptual and judgmental processes underlying such 
choices, as we have seen above (Forgas, 1989; 1990; Kunda, 1990; Parrott & Sabini, 1990; 
Sanidoso et al., 1990). Heuristic processing in turn may be influenced by affect more 
directly, as moods themselves may be used as a source of heuristic information about 
reactions to a target (Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
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The proposed classification of processing strategies also helps to highlight some of 
the critical features of these processing alternatives. Full vj. partial information search: For 
example, both heuristic and motivated processing involves only a partial search and 
consideration of the available information, while both direct access and substantive 
processing assume full information search strategies. Pre-or post-judgmemal processing: In 
both direct access and motivated processing, the information processing serves to retrieve 
or support pre-existing preferences or judgments. Heuristic and substantive processing in 
turn are pre-judgmental, when subjects seek to compute a new evaluation. Productivity: In 
terms of Fiedler’s (1991) notion of productivity, the degree of productive, transformational 
processing required (and the impact of mood on processing) would increase with the 
adoption of direct access, to motivated, to heuristic, to substantive processing strategies. 
Top-down vs. bottom-up processing: Top-down or category-based processing and the role of 
prior expectations and categories should play decreasing role in judgments as we progress 
from direct access to motivated, heuristic and substantive processing strategies. The role 
bottom-up, attribute-driven processing should increase in the same order.
Affect and choice of processing strategy
The model implies that feelings do play a role in determining which processing 
strategy is adopted. Evidence for affect-mediated information processing comes from 
research on persuasive communication (Petty et al., 1991), as well as some of our earlier 
studies on person prototypes. Two conflicting processing strategies have been identified in 
research on person prototypes. Prototype-assimilation models (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) 
predict that highly prototypical targets (such as the ’extrovert’ or the ’introvert’) should be 
more memorable and more informative. But how would persons with unusual, non-typical 
characteristics be processed? Unusual, inconsistent or non-prototypical targets are often 
easier to encode and remember than are typical ones (Hastie & Kumar, 1979).
Assimilating information to a pre-existing prototype is the easier, less effortful strategy not 
unlike the heuristic processing style described earlier. Dealing with non-typical targets in
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contrast requires more effort and attention, as in the substantive processing strategy 
described above.
In one study, two levels of prototypicality (high vs. low) factorially combined with two 
levels of affective salience (high vs. low) to create realistic person stimuli (Forgas, 1983a). 
We found that affect selectively triggered heuristic or substantive processing (Forgas,
1983a; 1985), as salient, affectively loaded prototypes "dominate impressions, leading to the 
poor processing of prototype inconsistent characters. In the case of low salient prototypes 
the opposite effect was expected, with novel and prototype-inconsistent information .. 
leading to superior recall and predictions" (1983a, p. 156). These results are one of the few 
empirical studies demonstrating how affective states may determine whether substantive or 
heuristic information processing is adopted in these judgments. Following from these 
earlier studies, in a recently completed experiment we also found that the prototypicality of 
a target, and the mood of the judge had an interactive effect on selectively triggering 
heuristic or substantive processing strategies. Other recent work by Schwarz (1990;
Schwarz & Bless, 1991) provided additional evidence and a theoretical rationale for such 
mood-based processing differences.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter surveyed the main results of our research program on affective 
influences on social judgments, and the current theoretical status of the various explanatory 
models proposed to account for such effects. The evidence outlined indicates that short­
term mood states do have a reliable and robust effect on a wide variety of social judgments, 
ranging from simple behaviour monitoring tasks to complex interpersonal preferences.
Many - but not all - of these effects can be accounted for in terms of information-based 
models. The affect-priming framework predicts indirect mood effects on judgments through 
the selective priming and activation of mood-related constructs (Bower, 1991; Forgas & 
Bower, 1988). The strongest evidence for such a model comes from studies where learning, 
recall and judgmental latencies were carefully measured, and found to be consistent with 
affect-priming formulations (Forgas & Bower, 1987; Forgas et al., 1990). The affect-as-
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information model in turn predicts mood-based distortions in circumstances when 
unattributed affective states can be mistakenly attributed to a judgmental target, offering 
an alternative explanation of some of these findings (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 
1991). For the first time, we have also described here a series of studies showing more than 
mere mood-congruency in judgments. Motivated processing (Kunda, 1990) involves the 
directed, selective search and use of information to achieve a particular objective, as in our 
studies on interpersonal preference. These results led us to propose a new, integrated 
multi-process model of affect in social judgments.
Based on the results of our own research project as well as others (Bower, 1991;
Clore & Parrott, 1991; Fiedler & Forgas, 1988; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; et al.), in the final 
section of this chapter we proposed that four distinct information processing strategies are 
necessary to adequately account for the available empirical findings. (1) The direct access 
strategy is adopted when pre-existing, crystallized judgments are simply retrieved from 
memory. (2) Motivated processing characteristically involves the selective use and 
processing of information to serve a particular pre-existing objective. (3) Heuristic 
processing is adopted when judges choose to ignore or by-pass relevant information in 
order to simplify the judgmental task and form an impression using various shortcuts. (4) 
The substantive processing strategy, implicitly assumed by cognitive information 
processing models, occurs when the available information about a target is selectively 
processed, involving learning, associative and memory processes, in order to arrive at a 
novel judgment about a person.
These processing alternatives have their roots in various existing informational and 
process-based explanations, particularly in recent dual-process models (Fiedler, 1991; Petty 
et al., 1991). In turn, the multi-process model proposed here implies that affect influences 
(a) both the choice of a processing strategy, and (b) and subsequent learning and 
information processing.
Our results suggest that there is a pervasive tendency for people to perceive and 
interpret others in terms of their feelings at the time, and to use different information 
processing strategies depending on their temporary affective state. Affect-dependent
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differences in information selection, retrieval and interpretation of the kind demonstrated 
here may have particularly important consequences for real-life interpersonal decisions 
and applied judgments in organisations (Baron, 1987) as well as in health-related fields 
(Salovey et al., 1991). There is some recent evidence suggesting that mood effects on 
cognition and judgments are most likely to be significant when the information base is 
complex and elaborate, selective and constructive processing is required, and the evidence 
is capable of supporting alternative interpretations (cf. Fiedler, 1991; Forgas et al., 1990).
We started this discussion by arguing that historically, at least two alternative 
conceptualizations of social judgmental processes can be identified. The first, constructivist 
approach assumes that person perception is an active, even creative category-driven 
process (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986) where the characteristics of the judge are almost as 
important to the judgmental outcome as the characteristics of the target. The second view 
is more mechanistic, assuming that information about people is ’given*, with permanent, 
enduring meanings, and that the study of person perception therefore involves the analysis 
of the combinatorial, information integration strategies used by people (Anderson, 1974). 
The eventual reconciliation of these conflicting frameworks in the current social cognitive 
paradigm led to the empirical study of affective biases in social judgments (Forgas, 1981b).
We may conclude by observing that although much has already been discovered 
about the information processing and representational functions of affective states, not 
enough is known about how affect triggers and influences different processing strategies. 
The multi-process framework for analysing affective influences on social judgments 
proposed here should be useful in focusing attention on this important and as yet 
insufficiently understood question.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. The effects of mood on perceptions of interactive behaviours in self and others 
(after Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984).
Figure 2. Affective influences on processing latencies, (a) longer processing times when 
reading mood-consistent rather than inconsistent information, and (b) shorter 
processing times when making mood-consistent rather than inconsistent judgments 
(after Forgas & Bower, 1987).
Figure 3. Mood effects on internal vs. external attributions for success and failure in an 
exam for self and other (after Forgas, Bower & Moylan, 1990)
Figure 4. The effects of mood on interpersonal preferences: (a) partner choices, and (b) 
decision speed.
Figure 5. Mood effects on judgments of the likeability of people in a well-matched or an ill- 
matched couple.
Figure 6. Mood effects on the perception of people in a same-raced or a mixed-race 
couple.
Figure 7. The effects of seeing happy, sad or aggressive films on four different kinds of 
social judgments.
Figure 8. A multi-process model of mood effects on social judgments.
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